Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my family, my lineage, and my society for the historically improbable opportunity to dedicate a portion of my life to studying philosophy and psychology at such an influential institution. The value of an uncorrupted Faculty of Humanities is difficult to estimate. I extend my heartfelt thanks to my teachers, especially my supervisor for the insightful introductory class and for assisting me at the outset and conclusion of this essay. 

Studying ancient philosophy has allowed me to surround myself with some of history’s greatest mentors. The Socratic and Stoic philosophers, in particular, have profoundly inspired me with exemplary and timeless guidance on leading a meaningful, examined life. Becoming acquainted, to varying degrees, with these mentors and their works is an inescapable call to greatness – not greatness defined by fame or fortune, but by being a good person. 

I am forever indebted for my incredibly fortunate position in time and space, and I believe it is fitting to acknowledge this blessing that has been so gracefully bestowed upon me. I sincerely mean every word of gratitude expressed here, and I hope my actions consistently reflect these sentiments. I resonate with one of Marcus Aurelius’ thoughts in his work Meditations, where he recounts his debts and lessons: “Thanks to the Gods. They did all they could.” 

Author: Gustaf Andrésson

Supervisor: Martin Berzell

Examiner: Vuko Andric

Institution: Linköping University | Department of Culture and Society

Abstract

This essay explores the concept of true happiness in relation to Stoicism. It addresses the nature of true happiness and examines how Stoic teachings, its domain of ethics, can be applied to achieve it. The main source for this discourse is the renowned writings Meditations by the Roman emperor and Philosopher king Marcus Aurelius, who exemplified through his words and character how Stoicism, and philosophy in general, can serve as a guide to lead a happy life. Insights from other Stoic and non-Stoic philosophers are also included in the discourse, serving both to complement and contrast with the Stoic perspective. 

Keywords

Eudaimonia, happiness, practical philosophy, Stoic ethics, Stoic virtue, Stoicism, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations. 

Introduction

Approximately 2300 years after its dawn, Stoic philosophy is experiencing a resurgence in popularity in our time. Its teachings of self-control, resilience, and inner tranquility have found a strong resonance in the 21st century (Flood, 2020). From the painted porch in ancient Athens, traces of Stoicism can be found throughout the lucrative self-help industry, and even some scientific practices, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, are based on Stoic principles (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 335; Pigliucci, 2016, 6; Robertson, 2019, p. 12). While the widespread appeal of a philosophical movement could counteract an unexamined life, its popularity in media and culture can potentially obscure some nuances and complexities of the original philosophical school. A noteworthy example of this is the influential institution American Psychological Association arguably confusing stoicism (with lowercase s, alluding to a stoic personality and not the philosophical school of Stoicism (Robertson, 2019, p. 33)) with “reluctance to admit vulnerability”, and stating that stoicism is a marker of traditional masculinity, which “is, on the whole, harmful” (Pappas, 2019). These statements are made without the intellectually honest work of defining what is meant by “stoicism”, or “male stoicism” (American Psychological Association, 2018), thus muddying the waters about what a Stoic personality, and potentially by extension what Stoic philosophy, is actually about. 

Through examining the primary sources of Stoicism, a more complete and profound understanding of the true nature of Stoicism may be illuminated. The purpose of this essay is to explore and discuss the teachings of the Stoic school concerning the deep philosophical quest of true happiness: What is true happiness, and how, (if and to which degree), can it be achieved through the practice of Stoicism? Ultimately, a case will be made that Stoicism provides a sensible and comprehensive account of the definition of happiness, as well as a practical road to achieving it. Moreover, the practicality of philosophy as a guiding principle of life, with a specific focus on Stoicism, will be illustrated. The discussion of happiness will mainly draw from the precursor to the Stoic school: Socratic philosophy, especially from Aristotle who extensively wrote about happiness. The discussion on Stoicism will center on the Roman philosophers and their writings, primarily Marcus Aurelius and his sole written work Meditations, but also draw from the writings of Seneca, the teachings of Epictetus, and contributions from other ancient Stoics. 

Background

In order to investigate true happiness in relation to Stoicism, these terms must be precisely defined. This section aims to articulate a definition of true happiness and establish relevant premises for Stoicism, providing important background for the subsequent discussion. 

What is True Happiness?

The Anatomy of the Question of Happiness

Entangled in a definition of ”true happiness” might be an underlying philosophy about what humans experiencing this happiness are, what the world in which we live is, and what life even is. Without addressing these conditions in which happiness takes place, any attempt to define ”true happiness” might lack the context and clarity that philosophical discourse seeks to attain. The specificities of what constitutes true happiness, even if its abstract components (such as ”fulfillment of one’s form or function”) remain consistent, could differ depending on the creature seeking it. What brings happiness to humans might not align with the happiness of other beings, given the differences in their natures. We must find happiness within the confines of our existence, which, among other things, consists of our capacity for reason and our inevitable mortality. 

Aristotle claims that with the knowledge of what the human “function” is, we can understand what it means for it to be excellent (Aristotle, 1999, I.7). Objections against this “function argument” reflect the claimed relevance of fact-value distinctions; the distinction between objective observations (facts) and subjective beliefs (values), and the pointing out of facts not inherently carrying value (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021). This objection suggests that merely identifying the human condition and the condition in which true happiness occurs does not necessarily imply how we ought to act. Can we, through premises about, for example, what human beings are, make logical leaps to arrive at conclusions about what we ought to be or do? This “is-ought problem” of deriving prescriptive statements (statements about what ought to be) from descriptive statements (statements about what is) is a serious epistemological question relevant to the discourse of a flourishing life. 

In order to navigate the is-ought problem, articulating a more objective account of happiness could be attempted, to the extent that it is feasible. Perhaps there are universally accepted aspects of happiness, or at least a broad consensus, that can be discerned when examining the common opinion. If a large number of people make value judgments about happiness, and if they consider a particular value, such as integrity, to be a key component in true happiness, it could be viewed as an indication of the importance of that value in pursuit of this goal. However, while this wisdom-of-the-crowd approach may have its merits for understanding general beliefs, it remains within the descriptive domain; describing what people value, or what they believe we ought to value, rather than what we truly ought to value. It is descriptive of social attitudes, rather than prescriptive of ethical truths. 

To answer the call for a definition of happiness that is as objective and universal as possible, taking into account the conditions of human life and prescribing values that constitute happiness, we can look to objective list theories of happiness. Unlike ethical theories that focus on subjective states, wishes, and desires, objective list theorists posit the existence of objective goods that benefit us independent of our subjective attitudes towards them. Happiness then becomes a matter of values that are beneficial to our lives (Haybron, 2020, 1.1-1.2). The objective list serves as a framework of normative statements, that bridge the is-ought gap by proposing a definite set of relevant “facts” about achieving a certain state. Consequently, it can generate prescriptive statements, the validity of which depends on the validity of the objective list. If one agrees with the premises that being happy is valued above all else, and that fulfilling our purpose, which all humans have, leads to happiness, then it can be inferred that we ought to fulfill our purpose. However, it cannot be claimed that this ought is universally applicable, even if the premises of the existence and specificities of objective goods are universally accepted. Objective lists imply universality, but the acceptance of these items is still subject to debate and subjective interpretation (Crisp, 2021, 4.3). 

It is reasonable to argue that an objective account of happiness can be more valid than a subjective one: Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics (1999, I.1-I.2) by stating that all our actions aim at some perceived good. This claim appears irrefutable: If an action fails to achieve a valuable outcome, we cannot justify choosing it over an alternative action that achieves this better. All actions are thus means to achieve something desirable, until, in the chain of goods, we discover that which is valued in and of itself. Aristotle (1999, I.4) asserts that this ultimate value is happiness, which he notes is widely agreed upon. There is also consensus that being happy equates to living and doing well. If we always act to attain a perceived good, with happiness being the ultimate end, how can we be unhappy? Because our perceptions can be incorrect: We can be mistaken about what is good. Aristotle writes that the unwise do not give the same definition of happiness as the wise (1999, I.4). Therefore, a quest for practical philosophy is about providing an account of the constituent elements of a good life (Humphreys, 2019, 4). 

Happiness as Human Flourishing 

Philosophers commonly articulate the notion of the word “happiness” either as a state of mind or as a life of well-being for the person leading it: The first definition is viewed as a psychological concept that involves studying what constitutes positive emotional states, while the second definition suggests that happiness refers to a type of value related to utility contributing to flourishing (Haybron, 2020, 1.1). The first definition of happiness could encompass feeling happy about one’s flourishing, pertaining to the second definition, but these conceptualizations of happiness are distinct in a fundamental sense: The first definition is focused on feelings while the second definition is focused on activity. This is an additional division of the concept of happiness (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 1), with one perspective viewing happiness as pleasant emotions, and the other perspective viewing happiness as the successful engagement in meaningful activities, such as endeavors related to flourishing. 

Theoretically, we could achieve the emotional states in the first definition of happiness through something like Nozick’s (1989) thought experiment, The Experience Machine: immersing ourselves in a virtual world offering artificial pleasures indistinguishable from reality. Even if we set aside the behavioral science regarding the realism of sustained pleasure, this state of mind-view appears to strip away the core aspect of what it means to be human – our rational faculty – thus reducing us to seekers of sensation and pleasure, akin to animals. Solely relying on happiness as a positive emotional state seems devoid of the nobility and integrity associated with a well-lived human life, suggesting an intimate connection between flourishing and happiness. This discourse is thus concerned with the second definition of happiness as flourishing and well-being in life, because it encompasses a more long-term and holistic understanding of happiness, as opposed to the alternative definition dependent on emotional states. Furthermore, an objective list theory is sought after, to counter our aptitude to conceive of unsound and untrue constituents of a flourishing life. 

The Eudaimonic Account of Happiness 

If we can be wrong about what makes us happy, the question of what happiness is then becomes ethical: What values lead to happiness? The eudaimonic view on happiness, which is an objective list theory, addresses both what true happiness is, and the conditions in which true happiness is experienced. “Happiness”, which eudaimonia usually is translated as (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 1), is arguably an unsuccessful translation that does not encompass the meaning of the concept in its original form. The word eudaimonia consists of two Greek words: eu, meaning “good” or “well”, and daimon, meaning “divinity” or “spirit” (Gåvertsson, 2013; Kraut, 2022, 2). Although Aristotle does not explicitly highlight this etymology, it could provide some context to what happiness and living well, which Aristotle uses the word eudaimonia for, consists of (Kraut, 2022, 2). 

To clarify what divinity/spirit refers to, we can turn to Socrates who mentioned in front of the Athenian jury that the reason why he didn’t flee the city after receiving words that he was going to be put to trial for “corrupting” the youth and not believing in the gods of Athens (Nails & Monoson, 2022, 3) was because of an objection from his inner voice, which he called daimonion (Plato, 2020, 40a; Xenophon, 2012, p. 7). Socrates described this phenomenon as a superhuman thing opposing him, without exception, whenever he was about to do something that was not correct (Plato, 2020, 40a). This concept might sound strangely similar to our idea of the conscience, with a religious undertone of it being a quasi-divine higher power within, although it was not necessarily related to moral matters (Nails & Monoson, 2022, 1). 

Eudaimonism refers to one of three theses: 1. Virtue and the exercising of virtue is identical with happiness, 2. Virtue and its activities are the main component of happiness, or 3. Virtue, and virtue only, leads to happiness. Aristotle believed that no matter the idiosyncrasies of our lives, human beings are fundamentally the same: just like certain things make us sick or healthy, certain things make us happy or unhappy. Aristotle argues that we use our reason to think about the various human goods and that actions that most consistently lead us to happiness are virtuous activities of the soul (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 1, 4). Virtue is thus inseparable from happiness. 

Aristotle’s perspective on happiness revolves around the idea that eudaimonia is the most valuable thing for a human being. It consists of living in accordance with the highest good in humans, which is fulfilling our function: the unique purpose – telos – of the soul (Aristotle, 2011, 2.1). This function is about exercising virtuous and excellent activity (arête) of the soul, carried out across the entirety of one’s life (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 4). This aligns the Aristotelian view of happiness with the first two theses of eudaimonism. The third definition is excluded because of his insistence that external goods in some cases could be required for exercising virtue (Aristotle, 1999, I.6). Aristotle argued that although happiness is the ultimate good, constituents of a happy life, such as virtuous and excellent activity, are also intrinsically valuable, beyond their instrumental value in achieving happiness (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 4). The notion of happiness requiring virtue is also something that Socrates argued in Plato’s Republic (Brown, 2017, 6; Coumoundouros, n.d.), and later inherited by the Stoics. 

Objections and Alternative Definitions of Happiness 

In addition to objective list theories, other approaches to well-being include hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories. Hedonism broadly equates happiness with experiencing pleasure, while desire-fulfillment theories connect it with actually achieving desired goals. There are variations of these theories regarding what generates the most happiness or what constitutes a reasonable desire (Haybron, 2020, 1.1; Parfit, 1984, pp. 4-5). However, both these theories are fundamentally concerned with subjective states of happiness, and are therefore discarded. Merely the subjective experience of happiness is not sufficient for true happiness, and getting one’s personal desires fulfilled may not lead to true happiness either, because of our potentially faulty judgments about what actually leads to happiness (although some versions of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories address ill-informed desires). 

On the objection that certain definitions of happiness, including that of eudaimonia, may be self-centered, one might respond that because eudaimonist theories do not center on feeling happiness (Parry, & Thorsrud, 2021, 3), but rather concerned with acting in a way that produces happiness, it can prescribe actions benefiting a broader social context. Eudaimonia is thus less self-centered than the alternative definitions that have been discussed, which focus on the gratification of personal desires. While such desires might incidentally benefit the common good, they also hold the potential for the opposite, unlike eudaimonia, which, with its focus on virtue, would arguably preclude such desires. To maximize happiness in a broader social context, one might attempt a utilitarian approach. Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill measured happiness in terms of outcomes and societal impact (Macleod, 2023, 4.2). Mill introduces a qualitative dimension, distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures. The orientation towards maximizing qualitative and quantitative aspects of happiness could complement theories of happiness, but the definition of happiness remains. (Bentham’s definition of happiness was hedonistic (Sweet, 2001), whereas Mill’s higher and lower pleasures refer to that of the intellect and the physical, respectively (Macleod, 2023, 4.2)). Utilitarian approaches could rely on shallow theories of happiness, whose maximization might not be beneficial. Thus, the utilitarian perspective does not diminish the status of eudaimonia as an account of true happiness. 

The actual universality of objective list theories might also be of concern. Objective list theories, which aim to define what objectively constitutes well-being, are inherently subject to some degree of subjectivity in determining their content. The debate over what an objective list of happiness should include might be more of a scientific question rather than a purely philosophical one. It is, to some extent, possible to empirically investigate different modes of beings, such as hedonistic and eudaimonic approaches to happiness. However, the predominant method for measuring happiness is subjective self-reports (Haybron, 2020, 3.1; Holder, 2017). This inevitable reliance on subjective measures brings us back to philosophizing about a universal definition of happiness, perhaps with interdisciplinary elements: taking into account empirical observations and other relevant scientific evidence. 

There could exist a middle ground in this project of defining true happiness, between widely recognized goods (reflecting a form of objectivity) and intellectual arguments, to the extent that these views do not overlap. Alternatively, it might be beneficial to distinguish between a popular conception of happiness and a deeper philosophical understanding of true happiness. For this investigation into true happiness as it relates to Stoicism, settling with an objective list theory, with Aristotle’s eudaimonia as the dominant example, seems reasonable: It has been shown to provide a comparatively plausible framework for understanding happiness, and the Stoic view on true happiness aligns with an objective account. The Stoics largely adopt the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia, but with some significant modifications. The Stoic perspective of the happy life will be presented and discussed after some important premises of Stoicism have been established.

About Stoicism

Influenced by Socrates and the Cynics, Stoicism emerged as one of the dominating philosophical schools in the Hellenistic and Roman era (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023; Pigliucci, 2016). Probably less than 1% of Stoic writings survived till today, as is common with ancient texts. Most complete works come from three Roman authors: Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (Robertson, 2019, p. 24). The statesman, playwright, and philosopher Seneca wrote extensively. Lectures from the former slave turned philosopher Epictetus were recorded by one of his students. The Roman Emperor and Platonic Philosopher King Marcus Aurelius’ collection of private meditative notes written during his reign has since become widely read. It should be noted that Aurelius’ Meditations, serving as the main original Stoic work for this discourse, is not necessarily to be regarded as a comprehensive guide to Stoicism; it might be better understood as a handbook on how to use Stoic meditations to live properly. Additionally, it should be acknowledged that although the Stoic school maintained a core set of principles, there were disagreements among Stoics after Zeno (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 1.1; Pigliucci, 2016, 1.b). Common among the Stoics are the themes of self-agency, cultivating virtue, valuing reason, and living in agreement with Nature. 

Parts of Stoicism

In a sentence-long passage in the Meditations, Marcus Aurelius (2002, 8.13) notes: “Apply them constantly, to everything that happens: Physics. Ethics. Logic.” This is referring to the division of topics in Stoic philosophy since the founder Zeno (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 1.2). These three topics also include metaphysics and theology. Although this division was acknowledged by Aurelius, his main concern is clearly ethics, with the other domains being interesting insofar as they contribute to ethics (Robertson, 2019, pp. 25-26). Stoicism is primarily an ethical school, but examining its logic and physics is necessary for fully understanding its ethical teachings. The Stoics illustrate the interconnectedness of these parts by likening logic to the skeletal structure of a human, ethics to the elements of the flesh, and physics to the soul (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 1.2). The role of logic is to provide fundamental tools for clear reasoning and critical thinking, so that we can make sound judgments about the natural world and ethical matters. With logical tools at our disposal, we may investigate the domain of physics, gaining a deeper understanding of the universe and our part in it, so that we can align ourselves properly with Nature (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 2, 3). Stoic physics and logic profoundly shape Stoic ethics, as they provide knowledge about the nature of the world and the nature of humans (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 8). Furthermore, it indicates how we can, and why we should live in accordance with Nature. To set up the scene for discussing Stoic virtue in relation to true happiness, some concepts from these three domains relevant to understanding Nature will be presented. Other important ideas, such as managing perceptions and viewing virtue as the sole good, will be discussed later when this core concept of Nature has been established. 

The Nature

The Nature that the Stoics refer to is a multifaceted metaphysical concept. There are two senses of Stoic Nature (Stephens, 2004, 1): The first sense pertains to living in harmony with the rational and systematic cosmos, where events are providentially willed, resulting in a deterministic understanding of fate. The second sense refers to the inherent characteristics of different entities in the universe, such as the upward movement of fire, or the metabolic functions of living organisms, highlighting their distinct modes of existence. 

Regarding the nature of the world, it is considered a supreme good and divine organism. Marcus Aurelius contemplates two possible views of how the universe functions: either atoms are interacting randomly, like the rival school of Epicureanism asserted (Konstan, 2022, 3), or an intelligent providence is in charge. If the atomist account is correct, then what is the meaning or purpose of events? If the Stoic account of a unified intelligent whole is true, then accepting whatever happens and living in accordance with it becomes part of a greater purpose (Aurelius, 2002, 9.39). Regarding the nature of humans, we are rational and social animals. Marcus Aurelius notes that being rational also implies being civic (2002, 10.2). He insists that we are all interconnected, not by blood or birth, but by mind (2.1). Our divine capacity for reason – logos – unites us as a part of the whole (2.1, 6.23). 

This metaphysics answers why we ought to live in accordance with Nature in the first place: Because we are interconnected with other beings like ourselves, and living in harmony with our purpose as rational animals would be part of a divine providential plan. Aurelius (2002, 2.13; 2020, p. 13) writes that what is divine deserves reverence for its excellence, and what is human deserves reverence due to our kinship. A life lived in accordance with Nature is then something like a life that applies reason to improve social living. 

Determinism and Moral Responsibility

One might ask how a theory of ethics can arise from deterministic metaphysics. While the Stoic metaphysics is deterministic in terms of causation – stating that all events are the result of a cause determined by an inevitable line of cause and effect – they defend an agent causation view, which reconciles the idea of determinism and free will. Our actions are determined to the extent that certain causes initiate how we react, but different persons will react to these causes differently (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 2.8). The Stoics can thus argue that we have agency over our actions, and therefore moral responsibility to respond appropriately, while simultaneously loving fate and accepting what happens, as a part of a providential plan (Pigliucci, 2016, 2.a). We cannot bend Nature to our will – that lies beyond our control. Because Nature is good, and because we are a part of Nature, we must focus on what is within our control in the pursuit of living in accordance with Nature. Marcus Aurelius makes multiple remarks about no one being able to prevent him from acting in harmony with Nature (see 2002, 2.9, 3.11, 5.10, 5.28, 6.58, 8.41), which also implies a responsibility to do so (highlighted in 10.32). 

The Four Cardinal Virtues

The continuous project of carrying out one’s life in accordance with Nature can be achieved through the four Christian-like cardinal virtues of Stoicism: Wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance. Courage and temperance are needed to pursue valued goals. They are related to endurance and moderation. Justice is concerned with living in harmony with others, which includes honesty and fair dealing. Wisdom is about knowing the best course of action. (Pigliucci, 2016, 1.a; Stephens, 2014, 3). The type of wisdom that the Stoics are concerned with is, as defined by the founder of the Stoic school Zeno of Citium, phronêsis, or practical knowledge. This wisdom to make sound judgments about what is good and bad is not only one of the four cardinal virtues of Stoicism but also central to the other three (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 8; Pigliucci, 2016, 3). Marcus Aurelius writes that if we were to discover anything better than these virtues, it must be a truly wonderful thing that we ought to fully embrace. However, if nothing superior presents itself to the divinity that lives within us – our daimon (δαίμονα), as the original writing in Greek reads (Aurelius, 1908, 3.6.2) – then it would be wrong to exchange them, or allow anything that might corrupt us or tempt us off the path (Aurelius, 2002, 3.6; 2020, pp. 19-20). 

Stoicism as a Royal Road to True Happiness

With happiness defined as an objective account of human flourishing, and with some important elements of Stoicism established, the discourse on Stoicism as the pathway to true happiness can begin. Initially, the Stoic modification to the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia will be discussed. Following that, lessons taught and examples set by the Stoics, regarding happiness, will be analyzed. Lastly, objections to Stoicism will be addressed. 

The Happy Stoic

The Stoics largely agree with Aristotle’s definition of true happiness as eudaimonia, but there are some discrepancies and uniquely Stoic perspectives on it, which this section explores. 

Stoic Eudaimonia

Continuing the legacy of Socrates, the Stoics believe that human behavior is fundamentally rooted in rationality. Even when our behavior appears misguided, and misaligned with the universal goal of living a flourishing life, they originate from rational judgments about the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 4). In accordance with Aristotle’s argument about human action always being directed toward a perceived good, Marcus Aurelius (2002, 3.16) reflects on the commonality of relying on one’s reason to determine what seems to be the best course of action. If this commonality is correct, he asks what qualities distinguishes ”wild animals” and ”rutting humans and tyrants” from the good man, to which he provides a list including contentment, tranquility, accepting fate, devoting oneself to truth and justice, and faithfully preserving the spirit within, or daimon (Aurelius, 1908, 3.16.2; 2002, 3.16). 

Stoic ethics is essentially eudaimonic. The Stoics inherit the Aristotelian teleological view of happiness, meaning that they value happiness in the sense of fulfilling one’s purpose (telos) as a rational being, above everything else. As established, this telos was living in accordance with Nature. This entails not just living in agreement with our nature as rational and social animals, but also living in agreement with the cosmic Nature governed by a rational and divine principle (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 4, 4.1; Stephens 2004, 1). Human flourishing is about living wisely and virtuously, which is equivalent to living in accordance with Nature (Robertson, 2019, pp. 29-30), broadly meaning in harmony with the order of the world and the essence of the human. 

Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics rejected external goods as necessary for happiness (Wagoner, 2015, 2a). Externalities, such as health, wealth, reputation, pain, and pleasure, are neither inherently good nor bad because they happen to the good and bad alike, and can be used in both good and bad ways (Aurelius, 2002, 2.11; Parry & Thorsrud, 2021). This is similar to how Socrates argued that external advantages do not carry any moral value in and of themselves. They are indifferent; neither good nor bad, as they can be used for both virtue and vice (Robertson, 2019, pp. 29-30). For example, while wealth is generally viewed in a favorable light, it is surely conceivable that it can do more harm than good, if its holder becomes overly attached to this material asset, and succumbs to greed. 

Indifference Towards Externalities

Epictetus (1928, II.IX) categorizes things into three groups: good, evil, and indifferent. Good things include virtues and everything that partakes in virtue. Evil things are the opposite of the good and virtuous things. Indifferent things, such as wealth, health, and reputation, are neither inherently good nor evil, but they can be used for both. The Enchiridion of Epictetus begins with his dichotomy of control (Robertson, 2019, p. 62): Epictetus posits that some things are in our control, and other things are not. He lists the things within our control as opinion, aim, desire, and aversion, whereas things beyond our control include the body, property, reputation, and office. He explains that the things in our control are our own doing: Our thoughts, choices, and actions, free and unhindered from external forces, while the other things are matters beyond our own doing, dependent and restricted by external forces. Furthermore, he makes clear that we cannot achieve both external and internal goods, and suggests that we should aim at what is within our control, “by which alone happiness and freedom are procured” (Epictetus, 2014, I). The wisdom to know the difference between external and internal goods is a prerequisite for exercising Stoic virtue. 

Aurelius, possibly drawing from Epictetus (2014, V), that it is our judgment of external things that disrupt us, rather than the actual things themselves, and we have the power to wipe those judgments (Aurelius, 2002, 8.47). We can control our perceptions of them. We can choose to view them in a logical way, which Marcus Aurelius does several times in the Meditations (see for example his analysis of death, luxuries, and lovemaking, 2002, 2.12, 6.13)). Furthermore, the Stoics believed that expectations on external matters were the thief of happiness (Sellars, 2002, 3.e). Expectations ought, therefore, to be reserved for what is within our control (Robertson, 2019, p. 148). Even if we act virtuously, in accordance with Nature, perhaps we should detach ourselves from external outcomes, wishing that everything happens as it does, rather than as we want (Epictetus, 1928, XII), and not expecting Plato’s Republic to come about (Aurelius, 2002, 9.29). 

Although Stoics view things that do not affect our virtue as indifferent, these things are not without value. The Stoics recognized, for example, that being in a healthy condition is preferred to being in an ill condition. This concept is termed preferred indifference: Some indifferent results are desired, and some indifferent things are valued, but because they are external (by definition beyond our control) they do not affect one’s virtue and thus cannot impact one’s ultimate happiness (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021). One should strive to preserve one’s health, as this is preferred to sickness, but it is ultimately outside our control and does not add or detract from one’s virtue. Only what is within our control, such as using these morally neutral externalities in a certain way, can be good or bad, making these terms synonymous with virtue and vice (Aurelius, 2002, 9.16; Robertson, 2019, p. 56). 

The Stoic maintains equanimity regardless of the presence or absence of preferred indifferents, much like Marcus Aurelius describes his adopted father Antoninus’ attitude toward wealth: He utilized external goods when they were present, but did not miss them when they were absent, akin to Socrates’ display of moderation, as noted by Aurelius (2002, 1. 16). Appreciating external things given to us by fortune is something that the Stoics encourage. The Stoic teachings about self-discipline should not be mistaken for unhealthy self-denial (Robertson, 2019, pp. 102-103). The key lies in a golden mean-like moderation and detachment, avoiding both overindulgence and attachment to externalities. Aurelius frequently reminds himself in Meditations that what is beyond his control cannot harm him (see, for example, Aurelius, 2002, 2.1, 2.11, 7.14, 7.22). Only one’s own doings have meaning to the mind (6.32). 

We can certainly imagine events demolishing happiness based on the grounds of externalities. Similarly, we could intuitively feel as though we would be happier with certain externalities fulfilled, such as friends and wealth, which Aristotle suggested. To answer this, we could divide happiness, as previously alluded to, into lower and higher forms of happiness. The lower form stems from externalities that may be pleasant and useful in facilitating the exercising of virtue (Pigliucci, 2016), but which ultimately do not determine our ability for virtue, and thereby the higher form of happiness remains unchanged, as it is based on internal factors within our control. We can thus achieve “happiness” in fragmentary ways, but a complete and lasting happiness requires virtue, and virtue only. External and internal goods can be reconciled with the idea from Stoicism that external joys are a by-product of wisdom. Pursuing joy at the expense of wisdom, however, is a mistake that will lead us astray (Robertson, 2019, p. 101). A virtuous life is equivalent to a happy life, as claimed by the Greek Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (Kirby, 2011). Living viciously is therefore the same as living unhappy regardless of externalities. 

Is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness? 

One might wrestle with the notion of virtue being the only good leading to happiness, which the Stoics firmly hold (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 8; Stephens, 2004, 3). Aristotle, on the contrary, believed that external advantages could facilitate or diminish our ability to exercise virtue, to the degree that they are necessary for happiness. External goods, such as friends and wealth, are required (Aristotle, 1999, IV.4; Kraut, 2022, 2). Even though virtue might make dire external circumstances more manageable, he also posits that it is not reasonable to ascribe happiness to the person plunged in severe misfortune (Humphreys, 2019). This is an important distinction between Aristotle’s and the Stoic definition of eudaimonia, as the Stoics believe that our ability to exercise virtue, and thereby be happy, is always within our control, regardless of external circumstances. 

Are there conditions that could make a virtuous person unhappy? For the Stoics, an equivalent question is whether any conditions can completely strip away a person’s ability to exercise virtue. Can we still be virtuous in serious adversity? Epictetus asserted that his leg could be bound, but not even the god Zeus could take away his freedom of choice (1982, 1.1), likely referencing a story from his time as a slave: When his master tortured him by twisting his leg, Epictetus repeatedly warned that it would break, and when it did, he responded with something akin to “I told you so” (Seddon, 2003, 1). Epictetus grants permission to groan about such matters, but not to groan in the center of our being (1982, 1.18). Similarly, Marcus Aurelius urges the suppression of judgment, even amidst severe physical suffering (2002, 4.39), and asserts that the soul can decide not to be affected by evil (8.22). Neither can tragedy impair one’s ability to exercise virtue. Aurelius witnessed the death of eight of his thirteen offspring (Robertson, 2019, p. 14), which brought him deep sorrow, yet his virtuous character remained unscathed. Both Epictetus and Aurelius exemplify that external events are neither inherently good nor bad, but indifferent. Only that which corrupts one’s rational faculty – vice – can obstruct a Stoic’s happiness (Stephens, 2004, 3), and we possess the ability to master our vices and choose the way of virtue. Things that do not harm our character cannot harm our lives (Aurelius, 2002, 2.11). Given the Stoic modification of Aristotle’s framework of eudaimonia, of happiness being solely focused on virtue, the diligent student of the Stoic school would call himself truly happy. 

The Roman philosopher, politician, and orator Cicero, among his many titles, made rhetorical arguments in support of potentially controversial aspects of Stoicism in his work ”Stoic Paradoxes” (Clayton, 2001, 7.f). He made a case for the inherent connection between virtue and a happy life, arguing that only the virtuous can truly achieve happiness: True happiness can only come from within, and the cultivation of virtue has the power to make a person complete and self-reliant. Despite the capriciousness of fortune, or the malice of adversaries, the virtuous person remains sober and steady. One would not praise someone who is vicious, regardless of the external circumstances in their life. On the contrary, we would praise the person with an indomitable soul dedicated to virtue, regardless of their life’s externalities. Therefore, whatever is praiseworthy should be considered happy, prosperous, and worth pursuing (Cicero, 1892, II). Under no possible condition can the vicious life be happy. 

The alternative to viewing happiness as within our control would be, as Aurelius points out, a mistake: to entrust one’s happiness unto the souls of others (2002, 2.6), over which we have no control. Unlike the Aristotelian definition of eudaimonia, or any other theory of happiness deeming externalities as necessary, the Stoics, being completely oriented towards that within our control, do not rely on luck in the pursuit of happiness (Pigliucci, 2016, 1.a; Stephens, 2004). The idea that we are in control of our happiness holds considerable weight, as it can lead to the possibly unsettling yet liberating conclusion that we are ultimately responsible for whether we live a truly happy life or not. If we agree on the definition of happiness that Stoicism outlines, then we are in control of our happiness, and the Stoic doctrine provides guidance in that pursuit. If we, on the contrary, believe that happiness is partly, or entirely, beyond our control, then no mode of being will completely ensure our happiness. Regardless of which of these versions of happiness we are inclined to believe in, it might be more beneficial to bet on the former; acting as if living virtuously leads to true happiness. Even if we are agnostic about the Stoic framework of happiness, it can still provide useful guidance. 

The Stoic Ideal

Mentors and ideals play important roles in philosophy. Marcus Aurelius dedicates the first book of Meditations, titled Debts and Lesson, to express his gratitude to the people, and to the gods, who helped shape his character and philosophical outlook. Aurelius tells how it was completely his own fault if he failed, for then he had not paid attention to what they had taught him (2002, 1.17). The life of the Stoics could be of interest for evaluating its doctrine and observing examples of qualities to admire and emulate. Likewise, the words of Socrates would not hold the same potency had it not for the man himself, and his commitment to living an examined life. 

Historical Examples 

Seneca wrote and published more than the other Stoics, but the accounts of his life are questionable, in particular with regard to his political career. Some scholars have pointed out the supposed disconnect between what Seneca preached and how he conducted his own life, arguing that this to some extent undermines his philosophical deeds. Seneca did however endure hardships, not least during his exile, and he reportedly faced his death sentence gracefully, similar to Socrates (Vogt, 2020, 2.1; Wagoner, 2015, 1, 2, 2.g). 

From what is known about Epictetus’ life, he was born a slave during the reign of Emperor Nero. During his enslavement, he studied Stoic philosophy with the teacher Musonius Rufus, who is now regarded as one of the four great Stoic philosophers of the Roman empire (Seddon, 2003, 1; Stephens, n.d.). After being liberated from slavery he began lecturing and eventually opened his own school, where he taught for the rest of his life (Graver, 2021, 1; Seddon, 2003). His teachings, documented by one of his students, Flavius Arrian, came to inspire Marcus Aurelius to the degree where Epictetus is the “author” most referred to in Meditations (Robertson, 2019, p. 19, Seddon, 2003, 1). 

Socrates, in Plato’s Republic, asserts that the only way to achieve happiness, both personally and on a state level, is for philosophers to rule as kings, or kings to become philosophers (Coumoundouros, n.d., 1.e). Marcus Aurelius inherited a position of absolute power, and reluctantly so, due to how it had historically been shown to corrupt absolutely. He was an emperor who had been disciplined to work diligently in service of the people – demanding excellence of himself, but being tolerant to the imperfections of others. A testament to his virtuous character is how he was, and still is, remembered as ruling with virtue and wisdom, in times of relative happiness and prosperity (Gibbon, 1906, pp. 98-99). Substantial challenges were posed to him and the empire during his 20-year-long reign (Robertson, 2019, pp. 11, 44). Amidst military conflicts, the Antonine Plague, natural disasters, and other hardships, Marcus Aurelius wrote Meditations: a collection of personal, yet universally applicable, writings on how to live properly. He wrote it when no one was looking, for himself, with no intention of publication (Kamtekar, 2017). This gives us a genuine glimpse into the mind of a practicing Stoic, in one of the most historically powerful positions of office. The direct link to his thoughts, combined with his well-documented life (see for example biographies in Hadot, 1998 and Robertson, 2019), exemplifies the Platonic philosopher king he embodied. This is a strong reason why Marcus Aurelius and his book serve as the main source for this analysis of Stoicism and its practical utility. 

The widely different lives of these three great Stoics, using philosophy as a guide through adversity, may display the accessibility of Stoic philosophy, and philosophy in general. No matter our lot in life; whether we’re born a slave or turned an emperor, virtue is ultimately always in our control. Beyond the philosophical insight we can glean from the ancient Stoics, their stories might also offer profound inspiration. We may not be exiled like Seneca, but are we really active members of a social community? We might not be slaves like Epictetus, but are we not still slaves to our lower desires? We might not be rulers of a vast empire like Marcus Aurelius, but are we truly striving to govern our own inner citadel? 

The Sage

These three great Stoics – Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius – found solace in philosophy, and are now role models for the person looking to walk in the path of the Stoics. They, in turn, had their own role models. Seneca (n.d., CIV) suggests attaching oneself to Socrates and Zeno, among others. Epictetus also frequently quotes these philosophers, recommending the practice of asking oneself what they would do in a given situation, as a strategy to make optimal use of opportunities (1928, XXXIII). Marcus Aurelius writes about his gratitude towards his many mentors, foremost praising his adopted father Antoninus (1.6) which he instructed himself to take as a role model (2002, 6.30). All of these great philosophers arguably embody aspects of the Stoic Sage. The Sage, in Stoic thought, is a hypothetical role model perfected in virtue (Pigliucci, 2016, 2a). Such a person is believed to be exceptionally rare, comparable to the mythical Egyptian phoenix reborn from the ashes only once every 500 years. While becoming a Sage might be nearly impossible, the image of the Sage serves as an ideal for everyone to aspire to – not necessarily to become Sages ourselves, but to make moral progress (Stephens, 2004, 6). Even the smallest of steps in that direction is to be respected (Aurelius, 2002, 9.29). To the Stoics, the wise Sage is someone who values virtue above all else, who makes progress in living like a Stoic, and who enjoys a life of eudaimonia (Seddon, 2003, 5). He is not afraid of pain, poverty, or death, but only of not living virtuously, and being less than a complete human being. Cicero contrasts the wise and the virtuous, who are self-sufficient and content with themselves and their situations, with the wicked and greedy, who are slaves to their own desires and passions. He makes the case that the wise alone is free, for his virtues ensure that he is not a slave to vices (Cicero, 1892, V). Furthermore, only the wise are rich, as true wealth is found in the possession of fruitful and lasting virtue, which results in the lack of desiring anything else (Cicero, 1892, VI). 

How to Act

Meditations is filled with moral maxims on how to act if we are to live in accordance with Nature. We should refrain from saying or thinking anything excessive, keeping our thoughts and words straightforward and intentional. We should not act under pressure, with selfish motives, or without careful consideration, and once decisions are made through logic we should follow them unwaveringly. We should let the spirit within us embody social roles and responsibilities, like a soldier fulfilling his duty and accepting fate without needing external witness (Aurelius, 2002, 3.5). These descriptions are similar to the qualities he admired in Antoninus (see 1.16). The “few things” we have to do to live happily are diligently doing meaningful work here and now, with willingness, affection, and justice – with a sense of urgency, free from external distraction, hypocrisy, and self-centeredness, with a rational mind controlling anger and other emotions (2.5-2.7). He adds that no one can prevent this happiness (3.12), because it comes from within; from preserving our daimon (Aurelius, 1908, 3.12). This comprehensive list offers much guidance, but we are free to contemplate and write our own meditations on living as Nature demands, as Marcus Aurelius did. If we fulfill our natural duties as humans, which we might intuitively understand (as Socrates’ inner daimon perhaps suggests) by using our highest faculty – reason – to enhance our moral character and self-mastery, in service of a broader social community and the cosmic order, we may reach a state of inner tranquility, transcending external circumstances: Eudaimonia.

Only Philosophy Can Guide Us

This chapter seeks to articulate the practicality of philosophy in general, and demonstrate how it is an especially powerful theme in the Stoic school of thought. 

Philosophy as The Love of Practical Wisdom

Philosophy is arguably a very practical discipline, but it is not usually regarded as such. Although it is abstract, many of the questions of philosophy have clear practical implications. This discourse touches upon a few of these questions, such as the nature of human beings, and how we can achieve true happiness. Fundamentally, the study of philosophy is the love of wisdom, and the endeavor to achieve it, which Seneca highlights in one of his letters (n. d., XIV.LXXXIX). The word philosophy originates from two Greek words; philo meaning love, and sophia meaning wisdom. As established, the Stoics are mainly concerned with practical wisdom: Phronêsis. Philosophy, therefore, is not confined to theory alone; the love of wisdom can also be practical. 

Stoicism comes from the Hellenistic era; a period of time when philosophy was not seen as an academic affair but as a practical endeavor for living better and more flourishing lives (Seddon, 2003, a). The Stoic school in particular emphasized philosophy as a way of life, encouraging its students to apply it to everyday living (Hadot, 1998, p. 50; Pigliucci, 2016). Marcus Aurelius even claims to sacrifice intellectual pursuits to prioritize doing his job of practically applying philosophy (2002, 2.2, 3.14, 8.1). He describes the role of philosophy as something therapeutic that absorbs and heals (2002, 3.13, 5.8-5.9, 6.12), possibly referencing Epictetus’ (1928, III.XXX) analogy of the philosophy class being like a hospital: We are not well upon entering. (See also Nussbaum, 2013 for a discourse on the therapeutic role of Hellenistic philosophy, and philosophy in general, in public and private life.)

Marcus Aurelius (2.17) poetically describes the human condition as our bodies being like a river; decaying, and the soul is like a mist; whirling. Fortune is unpredictable, our perceptions are dim, our time alive is uncertain, and our reputation after we have departed is oblivion. He then asks what can guide us under these circumstances, to which he directly and shortly answers: Philosophy, and philosophy only (2002, 2.17). He follows up with what philosophy entails, mentioning what it does to the daimon instilled in us (Aurelius, 1908, 2.17.2). He lists: keeping it safe and unharmed, transcending pleasure and pain, acting with consistency and honesty, being independent of external events and other people’s doings, and above all embracing death cheerfully (Aurelius, 2002, 2.17). He suggests that the few things required to live happily, as previously outlined, is all that can be asked of us, even by the gods, (2002, 2.5). Furthermore, these things are also inherent to our nature, otherwise, Aurelius argues, philosophy would not demand them (5.9, 6.58). The project of philosophy is, as other Stoics and Hellenistic philosophers held, becoming the person philosophy seeks to shape us into (Aurelius, 2002, 6.30; Seddon, 2003, 4a). The path of philosophy is modest and clear (9.29). 

Memento Mori

“To study philosophy is nothing but to prepare one’s self to die”, reads a quote attributed to Cicero. The virtuous person, according to Musonius Rufus, lives without regret, embracing death without fear, and continuing to live in harmony with Nature till the very end (Stephens, n.d., 6). In the first letter to Lucilius, Seneca (n.d., I.I) observes that dying is not a single event occuring at the end of our lives, but rather a process that unfolds daily, entailing that we ought to value the present time and not become dependent on what lies in an unpredictable future. Epictetus notes that death itself is inescapable, but that we can forego our fear of it (1928, XXVII). Marcus Aurelius ponders that not only do we move closer to death on a daily basis, but the rational abilities of our mind may diminish before we get there, meaning that there is an urgency to develop our potential (2002, 3.1). He meditates on the aspect of dying with a clear conscience (2002, 6.30; 8,47), and to depart with peace and purity, harmoniously facing this natural and inevitable event (2002, 3.16; 12.1). 

Remembering that we are mortal – memento mori in Latin – is a Stoic reminder about the inevitability of death, and the fleeting nature of life. Our ultimate physical form is death and decay – a defining feature of the nature of humans. Not only must we know how to live well, according to Nature, but we must also know how to die well, as death is part of Nature. As rational beings, we are aware of our own mortality, and we can confront it courageously. Marcus Aurelius urges himself to acknowledge that he at any moment could die and that the ever-looming presence of the potential of death should determine his thoughts and actions. Death is, when analyzed logically, a necessary process of Nature. Thus, he agrees with the Epicureans that death is not to be feared (Aurelius, 2002, 2.11-2.12; Konstan, 2022, 4). In the final passage of Meditations (12.36), Marcus Aurelius contemplates whether the length of one’s life truly matters, concluding that the natural laws make no such distinction. He then ends with a directive to himself to make his exit with the same grace shown to him. 

Meditations and Handbooks

Epictetus (1928, I.XXVI.III) describes in his Discourses that the beginning of philosophy is self-awareness about one’s own governing principle: reason. If we lack this understanding, we risk overestimating our abilities, and making poor judgments, leading to a less examined life. Meditative writings, clearly exemplified by Marcus Aurelius, allow for this self-assessment. This is a stage of philosophical training which Epictetus identified. Aurelius uses this exercise to guide his inner disposition to live in accordance with Nature (Sellars, 2002, 3.d). He even asks himself how he can avoid unhappiness if he does not keep track of what his soul is doing (2002, 2.8). As our actions are dependent on how we represent things, Stoic philosophical life is focused on mastering one’s inner discourse (Hadot, 1998, p. 50). In the pursuit of this mastery, Marcus Aurelius frequently reiterates and reminds himself of Stoic principles, seemingly using them as litanies for lucidity and endurance. The Meditations is not a meticulously edited piece of writing crafted for an audience; rather, it is the personal notes of a Stoic student reflecting on how to live virtuously and happily. It emerged from someone who was his own advisor while adorned in the imperial purple cloak. This text serves as an unfiltered demonstration of how we can use Stoic meditations to guide ourselves. Through meditative thinking – whether recorded in a handbook or not – we can contemplate the Sage, remind ourselves of our mortality, learn to embrace fate, practice the dichotomy of control, and envision ourselves as having shoulders of ivory. 

Objections to the Way of the Stoic

This chapter examines flaws within the Stoic school, ranging from serious criticism that challenges the foundations of its teachings, to addressing common caricatures of Stoicism. 

The Abstract Nature of Stoic Nature

Nietzsche dedicates a paragraph in Beyond Good and Evil (1997, 1.9) to critiquing the Stoic doctrine. Worth noting is that some of this critique is targeted at philosophy in general, and its supposed tyranny of philosophy to exhibit not a will to truth, but a will to power, akin to other human endeavors (Anderson, 2024, 3.2.1; Nietzsche, 1997, 1.9). “You desire to LIVE “according to Nature”? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words!” he mockingly begins his remarks on Stoicism. He asserts that the Stoics view Nature in a faulty way. According to Nietzsche’s logic, if one lives according to a Nature that is boundless, indifferent and uncertain, which the Stoics indeed describe it as, then what are we really living in accordance with? This piece of criticism should be taken seriously, as knowing what is meant by Nature is a crucial premise of exercising Stoicism: If we cannot articulate what “Nature” is, then what are we living in accordance with? Perhaps a self-made set of beliefs and values that we are ascribing to this all-encompassing Nature, as Nietzsche argued. He further states that the Stoics succumb to the philosophical impulse to develop a canon of beliefs and project them onto metaphysical concepts like “God” or “Nature” as objective facts, thereby imposing tyranny not only upon themselves but also upon others. 

Regarding the general critique of philosophy imposing tyrannical beliefs on others, it could be worth noting that although a description of the way the world works is provided, as truths, the Stoic doctrine works without being all-encompassing: What truly matters is virtue, which is incumbent on us to exercise, as individuals (Robertson, 2019, p. 184). Furthermore, the Stoic does not resent those who disbelieve his lifestyle, nor does he lose focus on staying on the path of Stoicism (Aurelius, 2002, 3.16). Acting in accordance with Nature does not require anyone else’s participation. It is an individual philosophy of conduct, solely dependent on the individual to adopt Stoic principles. 

To answer the critique of “Nature” being ill-defined, a Stoic might seek common ground by emphasizing the practicality of Stoicism, irrespective of the validity of its logic, physics, metaphysics, and theology, or in spite of the limited extent to which a practitioner might comprehend them. Viewing Nature as A. the inherent characteristics of organisms and B. something akin to the rational order of the universe, might be sufficient theoretical knowledge for living in alignment with it, albeit somewhat vague. For example, through our unique and divine rational ability, we might prescribe rational actions to be superior to animalistic ones, and such a philosophy can help choose uniquely human behavior over that of animals. For the Roman Stoics, perhaps most clearly Marcus Aurelius, the domain of ethics is at the center (Robertson, 2019, p. 69). He even expresses gratitude for not being too captivated by rhetoric, resolutions of syllogisms, or cosmological investigations (Aurelius, 2002, 1.17; 2020, p. 8). Marcus Aurelius might seem agnostic about what humans are and how the world works, and some of the possible contradictions in Meditations could be a result of this, yet, he also seems content with a general understanding. At one point, when he contemplates the Providence of Nature, he states that a few sentences on metaphysics which he outlines should be enough for him to treat as an axiom (Aurelius, 2002, 2.3). This account of Nature on a conceptual level, with its details being obscured, did not hinder him from exercising virtue like, arguably, very few people. Nietzsche does acknowledge the usefulness of Stoicism in times of turbulence and uncertainty (Nietzsche, 1974, 306), but also questions whether we actually feel “sufficiently miserable” for a Stoical mode of living (326). 

A Cold Inclination Towards Life

Stoics were not, as perhaps commonly misconstrued in secondary sources about Stoicism, emotionless, apathetic, or resigned from life. Neither were they miserable in relation to their understanding of true happiness. On the contrary, they believed that life is so valuable that we must seize the opportunity to live it well. Marcus Aurelius, reflecting on his “debts and lessons”, recounts learning from his tutor Sextus “to be free of passion and yet full of love” (Aurelius, 2002, 1.9; Robertson, 2019, p. 68). In Stoic thought, passions stem from incorrect judgments of indifferences as being good or bad, whereas true goods elicit rational emotional responses, which the Sage feels (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 4.7). This phrase – of not being a slave to passion but instead exhibiting love – captures the Stoic rejection of emotions that defy reason and Nature, while welcoming those in harmony with both. 

However, our emotions may not truly be within our control. Spinoza (1954, p. 252) asserts that the Stoics thought our emotions to be completely dependent on our will. Conversely, he believed that we do not possess this absolute sovereignty over our emotions. However, the Stoics did not promote not experiencing certain emotions, which would, to Spinoza’s point, be outside our control. Rather, we should not let them control us, which is within our control to do (Haybron, 2020, 2.4). Judging by Spinoza’s remarks on a man not being his own master if he is prey to his own emotions, and lies at the mercy of fortune (1954, p. 187), there is an agreement with the Stoics: Aurelius writes throughout Meditations that he ought not to let emotions of pleasure and pain overpower his soul, and override the knowledge of his rational mind (2002, 2.5, 2.17, 8.41). Thus, the Stoics do not claim control over emotions but reject giving emotions control over them. They hold that perceptions and beliefs, informed by emotions, are something we have agency over. Accordingly, we do not have to agree with initial impressions which inevitably manifest (Robertson, 2019, pp. 50-51). Through Stoicism, we might be able to control our judgments about them and choose our response with reason. With practice, we might even be able to influence our proclivity to impulsively feel certain emotions (Parry & Thorsrud, 2021, 8), if we reevaluate our philosophical outlook. 

Although, as Nietzsche alluded to, the Stoic doctrine might be particularly effective in difficult times, it is not necessarily the case that the Stoic outlook on life is dystopian. Negative visualization is certainly a part of the Stoic arsenal. Epictetus (1928, III.XXIV, also quoted by Aurelius, 2002, 11.34) advises that when we find ourselves experiencing delight in something, to imagine the contrasting impression. He gives an example of never seeing your friend again, and envisioning the mortality of your child as you kiss him good night. Such a vivid visualization might intuitively feel extreme to some, but it aligns with the view of the Nature of the world and the nature of human beings that the Stoics held. This view of life’s conditions being unpredictable, and potentially very harsh and fragile, is probably not a topic of controversy. Supposedly then the prescription of preparing for the worst is not a radical conclusion. The exercise of negative visualizations, albeit potentially pessimistic on the surface, serve as injunctions to take hold of what is worthwhile. Seneca (n.d., XCL) suggests that uncertainty adds to the weight of disaster. Contemplating potential misfortunes can help counteract this unexpectedness, proposedly leading to less distress and greater equanimity – much like a cliff that stands steadfast, regardless of how violently the waves crash against it. 

Self-Centeredness and Social Independence

This objection regards the alleged egocentrism and social isolation of Stoically minded people. While such a description of the Stoics probably does not come to mind when reading the primary sources, or when researching the lives of the Stoics, it is possibly a common contemporary misconception outside the academic sphere. It is true that aspects of self-improvement, such as self-control and self-reliance, are part of the Stoic doctrine, as they are necessary qualities to utilize if our rational faculty are to rule over our animalistic instincts. Discussions of these qualities are prevalent themes in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. 

While the individual is a domain of focus in Stoicism, its other two core relationships are that of other people and the world as a whole (Robertson, 2019, p. 102). The cardinal virtue of justice even means the love of other people (Hadot, 1998, p. 45), and Aurelius regarded it to be the source of all other virtues (Aurelius, 2002, 11.10). The Stoics promoted a cosmopolitan worldview, demanding that justice extend universally to all human beings (Marion, Shogry & Baltzly, 2023, 4.5). One might contend that selfish motivations could drive actions aimed at the collective well-being, as our interconnectedness and fulfilling the social aspect of living in accordance with Nature also benefits the individual involved, but this argument hinges on the relevance of psychological egoism in situations of serving a higher and broader good than one’s own immediate self-interests. 

Both Seneca and Epictetus discuss the themes of friendship and fellowship (Seddon, 2003, 2.e; Vogt, 2020, 2.2). Seneca contemplates the nature of true friendship, suggesting that even the self-sufficient and the wise, who do not require friends to be happy, still desire genuine friendship (n.d., IX). Marcus Aurelius himself probably experienced a sense of isolation during his time on the throne, having to deal with insincere individuals seeking favors from the emperor. He does however reflect fondly of his past personal relationships in Meditations (see Book 1). In a passage he reminds himself about the faulty people he will encounter that day, setting little to no expectations of them. His writing about not expecting other people to behave, or not worrying about what other people do, does not indicate a lack of care, but rather the opposite: At one point (3.4) he explains that we should not worry about what other people do unless it affects the common good, because this will hinder ourselves from doing useful things. Others’ actions are outside our control, and acknowledging this independence is one of the functions of philosophy that Marcus Aurelius outlines (2.18). The ultimate goal is not self-control; it is merely a means to the goal of living in accordance with Nature, and the nature of human beings includes a strong social element. Marcus Aurelius even states that we were born to live in symbiosis (2.1; 11.18) and that he, by his very existence, participates in a society and thereby also in a life whose actions ought to be directed toward a social end (Aurelius, 2002, 9.23). These examples from Marcus Aurelius (see 2.1, 3.11, 4.3, 6.48, 7.22, 9.1, 11.18 for further references) clearly demonstrate his devotion to the public good – a devotion to the needs of the empire that he respected in his adoptive father (1.16). 

Summary

Eudaimonia is a long-term and holistic view of true happiness, understood as human flourishing over a lifetime, not confined to psychological emotions or subjective judgments. Flourishing means living in accordance with one’s highest purpose, which for humans is aligned with our unique rational faculty. Stoicism adapts the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia to be solely dependent on virtue, thereby viewing externalities as indifferences. By following Stoic teachings we might achieve this version of eudaimonia, as Stoic philosophers before us have arguably done. Stoicism, and other philosophical schools contemporary to the Hellenistic era, encourage viewing philosophy not merely as a methodical construct but as a framework for conducting our lives. Philosophy is the love (philo) of wisdom (sophia), both theoretical and practical. 

The quest of philosophy is, for the Stoics, to acquire practical wisdom (phronêsis) to achieve excellence (aretê) in living in accordance with Nature, thereby fulfilling one’s purpose (telos) as a human, and, as a consequence, achieving true happiness (eudaimonia). Despite its supposed theoretical gaps and relative shallowness, Stoicism offers practical guidance for leading a fulfilling life and preserving inner divinity – our daimon. While the Stoics may not have been entirely correct on the descriptive elements of existence and the world, they embodied virtue, practical wisdom, and happiness in the truest sense. The Stoics could summarize a good life as: “Perform your role, assigned so gracefully by Nature, with justice, truth, and courage, so that when the curtain falls you may depart with a clear conscience, knowing you have lived in harmony with what is incumbent on a rational and divine being.” 

Marcus Aurelius contemplated the mortality of philosophers and leaders before him and asked himself where they are now. Nowhere, he concluded (Aurelius, 2002, 10.31; Robertson, 2019, pp. 20-21). But the names of the great Stoics are still echoed numerous centuries after they lived, and their teachings of modest, resilient, and virtuous living may be more popular and relevant now than ever before. If the path of Stoicism resonates with us, perhaps we ought to heed Seneca’s (n.d., CVIII) advice about the importance of putting our philosophical theories into practice. Instead of explaining our philosophy, maybe we should embody it, as Epictetus (2014, XLVI) taught. And rather than arguing about what makes a good person, we could simply strive to be one, as Marcus Aurelius (2002, 10.16) meditated.

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